6 However, stigma often remained attached and there could be strict separations between slave members of a kinship group and those related to the master. 7 Chattel slavery edit Chattel slavery is a specific servitude relationship where the slave is treated as the property of the owner. As such, the owner is free to sell, trade, or treat the slave as he would other pieces of property and the children of the slave often are retained as the property of the master. 8 There is evidence of long histories of chattel slavery in the nile river valley and Northern Africa, but evidence is incomplete about the extent and practices of chattel slavery throughout much of the rest of the continent prior to written records by Arab. Domestic service edit many slave relationships in Africa revolved around domestic slavery, where slaves would work primarily in the house of the master but retain some freedoms. Domestic slaves could be considered part of the master's household and would not be sold to others without extreme cause. The slaves could own the profits from their labor (whether in land or in products and could marry and pass the land on to their children in many cases.
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They claim no reward for their services except food and clothing, and are treated with kindness or severity, according to the good or bad disposition of their masters. Custom, however, has established certain rules with regard to the treatment of slaves, which it is thought dishonourable to violate. Thus the domestic slaves, or such as are born in a mans own house, are treated with more lenity than those which are purchased with money. But these restrictions on the power of the master extend not to the care of prisoners taken in war, nor to that of slaves purchased with money. All these unfortunate beings are considered as strangers and foreigners, who have no right to the protection of the law, and may be treated with severity, or sold to a stranger, according to the pleasure of their owners." Travels in the Interior of Africa, mungo. Ii, chapter xxii war and Slavery. The forms of slavery in Africa were closely related to kinship structures. In many African communities, where land could not be owned, enslavement of individuals was used as a means to increase the influence a person had and expand connections. 7 This made slaves a permanent part of a master's lineage and the children of slaves could become closely connected with the larger family ties. 1 Children of slaves born into families could be integrated into the master's kinship group and rise to prominent positions within society, even plot to the level of chief in some instances.
The importance of domestic plantation slavery increased during the 19th century due to the abolition of the Atlantic slave trade. Many African states dependent on the international slave trade reoriented their economies towards legitimate commerce worked by slave labor. 3, contents, forms of slavery edit, multiple forms of slavery and servitude have existed throughout Africa during its history and were shaped by indigenous practices of slavery as well as the. Roman institution of slavery citation needed (and the later, christian views on slavery the, islamic institutions of slavery via the, arab slave trade, and eventually the Atlantic slave trade. 1 Slavery was a part of the economic structure of African societies for many centuries, although the extent varied. 1 Ibn Battuta, who visited the ancient kingdom of Mali in the mid-14th century, recounts that the local inhabitants vied with each other in the number of slaves and servants they had, and was himself given a slave boy as a "hospitality gift.". 5 Many communities had surgery hierarchies between different types of slaves: for example, differentiating between those who had been born into slavery and those who had been captured through war. 6 "The slaves in Africa, i suppose, are nearly in the proportion of three to one to the freemen.
The main slave routes in lab medieval Africa. Slavery has historically been widespread in Africa, and still continues today in some countries. Systems of servitude and slavery were common in parts essay of, africa, as they were in much of the ancient world. In many African societies where slavery was prevalent, the enslaved people were not treated as chattel slaves and were given certain rights in a system similar to indentured servitude elsewhere in the world. Arab slave trade and, atlantic slave trade began, many of the local slave systems began supplying captives for slave markets outside Africa. 1, slavery in historical Africa was practiced in many different forms: Debt slavery, enslavement of war captives, military slavery, and criminal slavery were all practiced in various parts of Africa. 2, slavery for domestic and court purposes was widespread throughout Africa. Plantation slavery also occurred primarily on the eastern coast of Africa and in parts of West Africa.
Such an agenda, says Eqbal Ahmad, is "very reassuring to the men and women who are stranded in the middle of the ford, between the deep waters of tradition and modernity.". But we are all swimming in those waters, westerners and Muslims and others alike. And since the waters are part of the ocean of history, trying to plow or divide them with barriers is futile. These are tense times, but it is better to think in terms of powerful and powerless communities, the secular politics of reason and ignorance, and universal principles of justice and injustice, than to wander off in search of vast abstractions that may give momentary satisfaction. "The Clash of civilizations" thesis is a gimmick like "The war of the worlds better for reinforcing defensive self-pride than for critical understanding of the bewildering interdependence of our time. This article discusses systems, history, and effects of slavery within Africa. Arab slave trade, atlantic slave trade, maafa, and, slavery in contemporary Africa for other discussions.
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One further reason for its persistence is the increased presence of Muslims all over Europe and the United States. Think of the populations today of France, italy, germany, spain, Britain, America, even Sweden, and you must concede group that Islam is no longer on the fringes of the west but at its center. But what is so threatening about that presence? Buried in the collective culture are memories of the first great Arab-Islamic conquests, which began in the seventh century and which, as the celebrated Belgian historian Henri pirenne wrote in his landmark book. Mohammed and Charlemagne (1939 shattered once and for all the ancient unity of the mediterranean, destroyed the Christian-Roman synthesis and gave rise to a new civilization dominated by northern powers (Germany and Carolingian France) whose mission, he seemed to be saying, is to resume defense.
What Pirenne left out, alas, writing is that in the creation of this new line of defense the west drew on the humanism, science, philosophy, sociology and historiography of Islam, which had already interposed itself between Charlemagnes world and classical antiquity. Islam is inside from the start, as even Dante, great enemy of Mohammed, had to concede when he placed the Prophet at the very heart of his. Then there is the persisting legacy of monotheism itself, the Abrahamic religions, as louis Massignon aptly called them. Beginning with Judaism and Christianity, each is a successor haunted by what came before; for Muslims, Islam fulfills and ends the line of prophecy. There is still no decent history or demystification of the many-sided contest among these three followersnot one of them by any means a monolithic, unified campof the most jealous of all gods, even though the bloody modern convergence on Palestine furnishes a rich secular instance. Not surprisingly, then, muslims and Christians speak readily of crusades and jihads, both of them eliding the judaic presence with often sublime insouciance.
At some level, for instance, primitive passions and sophisticated know-how converge in ways that give the lie to a fortified boundary not only between "West" and "Islam" but also between past and present, us and them, to say nothing of the very concepts of identity. A unilateral decision made to draw lines in the sand, to undertake crusades, to oppose their evil with our good, to extirpate terrorism and, in paul Wolfowitzs nihilistic vocabulary, to end nations entirely, doesnt make the supposed entities any easier to see; rather, it speaks. In a remarkable series of three articles published between January and March 1999. Dawn, pakistans most respected weekly, the late Eqbal Ahmad, writing for a muslim audience, analyzed what he called the roots of the religious right, coming down very harshly on the mutilations of Islam by absolutists and fanatical tyrants whose obsession with regulating personal behavior promotes. The phenomenon distorts religion, debases tradition, and twists the political process wherever it unfolds." As a timely instance of this debasement, Ahmad proceeds first to present the rich, complex, pluralist meaning of the word jihad and then goes on to show that in the words. Theirs is a very limited and time-bound political agenda." What has made matters worse is that similar distortions and zealotry occur in the "Jewish" and "Christian" universes of discourse.
It was Conrad, more powerfully than any of his readers at the end of the nineteenth century could have imagined, who understood that the distinctions between civilized London and "the heart of darkness" quickly collapsed in extreme situations, and that the heights of European civilization. And it was Conrad also,. The secret Agent (1907 who described terrorisms affinity for abstractions like "pure science" (and by extension for "Islam" or "the west as well as the terrorists ultimate moral degradation. For there are closer ties between apparently warring civilizations than most of us would like to believe; both Freud and nietzsche showed how the traffic across carefully maintained, even policed boundaries moves with often terrifying ease. But then such fluid ideas, full of ambiguity and skepticism about notions that we hold on to, scarcely furnish us with suitable, practical guidelines for situations such as the one we face now. Hence the altogether more reassuring battle orders (a crusade, good versus evil, freedom against fear, etc.) drawn out of Huntingtons alleged opposition between Islam and the west, from which official discourse drew its vocabulary in the first days after the september 11 attacks. Theres since been a noticeable de-escalation in that discourse, but to judge from the steady amount of hate speech and actions, plus reports of law enforcement efforts directed against Arabs, muslims and Indians all over the country, the paradigm stays.
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This is the problem with unedifying labels like islam and the west: They mislead and confuse the mind, which is trying to make sense of a disorderly reality bill that wont be pigeonholed or strapped down as easily as all that. I remember interrupting a man who, after a lecture i had given at a west Bank university in 1994, rose from the audience and started to attack my ideas as "Western as opposed to the strict Islamic ones he espoused. "Why are you wearing a suit and tie?" was the first retort that came to mind. "Theyre western too." he sat down with an embarrassed smile on his face, but I recalled the incident when information on the september 11 terrorists started to come in: how they had mastered all the technical writing details required to inflict their homicidal evil on the. Where does one draw the line between "Western" technology and, as Berlusconi declared, "Islams" inability to be a part of "modernity"? One cannot easily do so, of course. How finally inadequate are the labels, generalizations and cultural assertions.
But why not instead see parallels, admittedly less spectacular in their destructiveness, for Osama bin Laden paper and his followers in cults like the Branch davidians or the disciples of the rev. Jim Jones at guyana or the japanese aum Shinrikyo? Even the normally sober British weekly. The Economist, in its issue of September 22-28, cant resist reaching for the vast generalization, praising Huntington extravagantly for his "cruel and sweeping, but nonetheless acute" observations about Islam. "Today the journal says with unseemly solemnity, huntington writes that "the worlds billion or so muslims are convinced of the superiority of their culture, and obsessed with the inferiority of their power." Did he canvas 100 Indonesians, 200 Moroccans, 500 Egyptians and fifty bosnians? Even if he did, what sort of sample is that? Uncountable are the editorials in every American and European newspaper and magazine of note adding to this vocabulary of gigantism and apocalypse, each use of which is plainly designed not to edify but to inflame the readers indignant passion as a member of the "West. Churchillian rhetoric is used inappropriately by self-appointed combatants in the wests, and especially Americas, war against its haters, despoilers, destroyers, with scant attention to complex histories that defy such reductiveness and have seeped from one territory into another, in the process overriding the boundaries that.
from a perch outside all ordinary attachments and hidden loyalties, is the correct one, as if everyone else were scurrying around looking for the answers that he has already found. In fact, huntington is an ideologist, someone who wants to make "civilizations" and "identities" into what they are not: shut-down, sealed-off entities that have been purged of the myriad currents and countercurrents that animate human history, and that over centuries have made it possible for. This far less visible history is ignored in the rush to highlight the ludicrously compressed and constricted warfare that "the clash of civilizations" argues is the reality. When he published his book by the same title in 1996, huntington tried to give his argument a little more subtlety and many, many more footnotes; all he did, however, was confuse himself and demonstrate what a clumsy writer and inelegant thinker he was. The basic paradigm of West versus the rest (the cold war opposition reformulated) remained untouched, and this is what has persisted, often insidiously and implicitly, in discussion since the terrible events of September. The carefully planned and horrendous, pathologically motivated suicide attack and mass slaughter by a small group of deranged militants has been turned into proof of Huntingtons thesis. Instead of seeing it for what it isthe capture of big ideas (I use the word loosely) by a tiny band of crazed fanatics for criminal purposesinternational luminaries from former pakistani Prime minister Benazir Bhutto to Italian Prime minister Silvio berlusconi have pontificated about Islams. (Berlusconi has since made a halfhearted apology for his insult to "Islam.
Nation states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations. The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics. The fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future.". Most of the argument in the pages that followed relied on a vague notion of something Huntington called "civilization identity" and "the interactions among seven or eight sic major civilizations of which the conflict between two of them, Islam and the west, gets the lions. In this belligerent kind of thought, he relies heavily on a 1990 article by the veteran Orientalist Bernard Lewis, whose ideological colors are manifest in its title, "The roots of Muslim Rage." In both articles, the personification of enormous entities called "the west" and "Islam". Certainly neither Huntington nor Lewis has much time to spare for the internal dynamics and plurality of every civilization, or for the fact that the major contest in most modern cultures concerns the definition or interpretation of each culture, or for the unattractive possibility that. No, the west is the west, and Islam Islam.
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Samuel Huntingtons article "The Clash of civilizations?" appeared in the summer 1993 issue. Foreign Affairs, where it immediately attracted a surprising amount of attention and reaction. Because the article was intended to supply Americans with an original thesis about "a new phase" in world politics after the end of the cold war, huntingtons terms of argument seemed compellingly large, bold, even visionary. He very clearly had his eye on rivals in the policy-making ranks, theorists such as Francis fukuyama and his "end of history" ideas, as well as the legions who had celebrated the onset of globalism, tribalism and the dissipation of the state. But they, he resume allowed, had understood only some aspects of this new period. He was about to announce the "crucial, indeed a central, aspect" of what "global politics is likely to be in the coming years." Unhesitatingly he pressed on: "It is my hypothesis that the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural.